The calculative turn in land value capture: lessons from the English planning system by McAllister, Pat
The calculative turn in land value capture: 
lessons from the English planning system 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 
McAllister, Pat (2017) The calculative turn in land value 
capture: lessons from the English planning system. Land Use 
Policy, 63. pp. 122-129. ISSN 0264-8377 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.01.002 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/69596/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.01.002 
Publisher: Elsevier 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
 1 
 
Introduction 
In England, for over three decades planning obligations have been the main mechanism by which 
the community has been able to capture some of the uplift in land values ‘released’ by planning 
permission.  Since around 2005, there has been an incremental but major shift in how policy 
regarding planning obligations has been formed and how planning obligations are negotiated for 
individual development schemes.  This has involved financial viability becoming a central 
consideration in planning policy making and development management.  In essence, ostensibly to 
ensure that development is deliverable, a viability test involves a quantitative calculation of whether 
policies regarding planning obligations compromise a “competitive” financial return to the land 
owner and the developer.  In a period of high levels of policy innovation and/or volatility in the 
English planning system, this has been a fundamental change in the planning regime.  In policy 
making, the main application of financial viability modelling has been in the formation of local 
planning policy regarding planning obligations (mainly requirements for non-market housing 
provision and contributions to education, health, infrastructure and other community facilities).  
Following the introduction of the Community Infrastructure Levy in 2012, local planning authorities 
were also required to apply financial viability tests to assess whether it would compromise 
deliverability.  For specific development schemes, viability calculations have been at the nexus of 
community opposition to proposed major regeneration projects.    It is the scheme, rather than policy 
making, level that is the main focus of this paper where issues of methodology and process in 
viability calculations have been extremely controversial (see Colenutt, Cochrane and Field, 2015). 
 
In the context of development management, particularly where a proposed development does not 
comply with policy, viability tests are increasingly being used as the basis for negotiating (and re-
negotiating) planning obligations for individual proposed development projects.  Whilst prima facie 
viability appraisal might seem like a straightforward, technical test, in practice it has proved very 
contentious.  Providing an impression of technocratic rationality, development viability appraisal 
can be conceptualised as a calculative practice that has become increasingly embedded in the English 
planning system.  A common attraction of quantification and technical models is that they appear to 
involve an apparently value neutral process.  However, their use can be associated with a tendency 
for unquestioning, institutionalised trust in numbers and, by reconfiguring subjective and contestable 
judgements as pseudo-scientific, may permit essentially political processes to be presented as 
technical procedures (Mennicken et al, 2008).  Given their implications for the allocation of land 
value uplifts between communities and land owners, the application of these apparently technocratic 
procedures has become increasingly controversial. In July 2015, Boris Johnson, the Mayor of 
London, described financial viability assessments as “something of a dark art”.  In this paper, the 
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focus is on the operational issues that have emerged in the application of viability calculations in the 
English planning system. 
 
There is limited codified knowledge on the use of viability tests.  A great deal of what we ‘know’ 
about the role of viability tests is based upon the fragmented, often impressionistic, observations of 
market participants and planning professionals and case studies of specific schemes.  There has been 
no systematic research into the extent and nature of the use of viability tests in development 
management processes.  Similarly, there is little explicit knowledge on the procedures in place to 
evaluate viability appraisals. How consistent and rigorous are evaluation procedures?  Do local 
authorities and the Planning Inspectorate have the necessary expertise to adjudicate on viability 
issues?  Tension between the commercial confidentiality of developers and community participation 
in and the transparency of the planning process has been a particularly controversial issue with a 
number of adjudications by the Information Commissioner’s Office. 
 
This paper provides a formative, process evaluation of the introduction of financial viability criteria 
into development management via the use of development viability calculations.  The approach to 
evaluation is ‘realist’ in that the objective is to establish what it is about the policy that works (or 
does not work), for whom and in what circumstances?  Whilst the use of viability appraisal models 
has become increasingly controversial, there has been limited evaluation to date of the application 
of these calculative procedures.  It also needs to be acknowledged that, given the ideological and 
distributional salience of this issue, researcher objectivity is problematic.  Indeed, most academic 
researchers engaged in this area have been involved in writing guidance and advising governmental, 
professional and/or community organisations.  As such, the contribution of academics such as Peter 
Wyatt and Bob Colenutt has been both performative and analytic or descriptive1.  Given this point 
and limited documented empirical research, the evaluation draws substantially on an element of 
participant action research. Whilst there are varying degrees of ‘insiderness’, the researcher’s 
participation in a range of relevant events and meetings, personal relationships with key participants 
and contributions to various consultation exercises provided multiple points of access to key 
concerns and perspectives on the topic.  This access, in addition to a review of documented analysis, 
empirical research and inference, informs this evaluation. 
 
Viability as a Policy Construct 
       
                                                          
1 For instance, Bob Colenutt has appeared as appeared as an expert on viability issues before the Greater 
London Assembly Planning Committee and has appeared as a witness on viability issues at Freedom of 
Information tribunals.  Peter Wyatt is a member of the RICS Committee that produced the RICS’ Financial 
Viability in Planning guidance and continues to be involved in drafting updated guidance.  
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In this paper, the introduction of financial viability criteria into planning policy formation and 
development management is framed as a policy innovation.  Whilst policy making is often 
understood to involve explicit articulation of activities undertaken by government, often through 
legislation, to achieve outcomes, policy can also be tacit or implicit and, rather than being formally 
stated, can be inferred from practice.  It may even involve a decision to be inactive.   The introduction 
of financial viability criteria into planning policy formation and decisions does not fit easily into a 
rationalist policy formulation model such as the ‘Rationale → Objectives → Appraisal → 
Monitoring → Evaluation → Feedback’ cycle.  Lindblom's (1959) depiction of ad hoc, incremental, 
policy evolution by a ‘muddling through’ process of trial-and-error reflects the (almost certainly) 
unintended consequences of the introduction of financial viability criteria into the planning system.  
In this specific context, the ‘morphogenesis’ of the policy as it has mutated in form and grown in 
scope and scale has created ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Pawson et al., 2005).  In turn, as the policy of 
applying financial criteria has evolved and grown in scope and scale, there has also been a process 
of policy learning by central government policy makers, local planning authorities, professional 
institutions and community activists among others. 
 
It is difficult to identify an explicit theory or rationale for the policy change.  Central government 
planning policy makers did not make it explicit (at least to the public) how they believed that this 
policy instrument was going to work before its implementation. The underlying policy theory seems 
to have been implicit.  Within the broad objective of increasing the supply of both non-market and 
market housing, the policy of financial viability testing seems to have been introduced in order to 
promote development stalled by the ‘burden’ of planning obligations that was rendering it financially 
unviable and ensure that sites were not allocated for development where it was not financially 
feasible to develop.  Viability modelling could also provide a basis for local authorities to 
demonstrate that their policies on planning obligations were consistent with appropriate economic 
incentives for land owners and developers.  The rationale for the use of viability calculations seems 
to have been to provide an objective mechanism for calculating the amount of planning obligations 
that could be generated by a project. It is unlikely that the policy of introducing financial viability 
criteria into planning decisions was initially designed to achieve some of the outcomes that have 
emerged.  Indeed, it is difficult to identify any conventional policy design at all.   
 
Given the scope and scale of the policy of using financial viability appraisals in planning decisions 
and policy making, an assessment of the outcomes of this policy change is particularly challenging.   
Many assumptions about appropriate measures, causal mechanisms and timescales would be highly 
contestable.  As in most policy innovations, a major problem in evaluation is the absence of valid 
counterfactuals.  It is widely assumed that the introduction of viability appraisals has enabled 
developers to decrease the level of land value capture through planning obligations than would 
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otherwise have occurred.  However, it is extremely challenging to robustly estimate whether 
observed outcomes are the products of policies changes.   In addition, as noted above, the policy has 
evolved and expanded in scope over time.  As such, the focus of this paper is on the process rather 
than the outcomes. 
 
It is also important to appreciate the wider housing policy context in which the policy of using 
viability calculations in planning has emerged.  Arguably the calculations and related guidance on 
their application could easily have evolved to favour the interests of the community.  At a 
presentation in 2015, Duncan Bowie (a former advisor on housing policy to the Mayor of London) 
outlined how, in the period 2001-2003, he pioneered ago the use of viability modelling.  In 2001-
2003, his aim was to provide a robust evidence base that could demonstrate that a planning policy of 
requiring provision of 50% non-market housing could be feasible in many areas of London.  When 
viability appraisals initially emerged in negotiations on planning obligations, generally developers 
were (and remain) reluctant to ‘open their books’ and were resistant to the viability process.  In 2006, 
planning guidance from central government was exhorting local planning authorities to be more pro-
active in seeking planning obligations and “to recognise that such obligations will increasingly be 
viable on new housing developments”.  However, the Coalition government (and its Conservative 
successor) formed in 2010 proved to be more sympathetic to the interests of land owners and private 
sector house builders.  In particular, a myriad of major policy initiatives and relatively minor pieces 
of policy guidance seem to reflect a broad policy prejudice against the provision of non-market, 
rental housing2 - the single most important source of community gain from planning obligations 
(DCLG, 2013).    
 
As noted above, the policy of introducing financial viability criteria in planning policy making and 
development management seems to have emerged in an incremental and ad hoc manner.  Circulars 
and Planning Policy Statements were the main instruments by which the policy was communicated 
to local planning authorities by the central government department responsible for national planning 
policies.  Essentially their planning circulars and policy statements provide non-statutory advice and 
guidance on particular issues to expand on subjects referred to in legislation.  They are used to 
explain policy and regulation more fully. Circulars can be quasi-legislative and include a direction 
or requirement to take specific action or provide guidance on implementation of aspects of planning   
                                                          
2 A few examples…The Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 permitted developers to obtain reductions in 
previously agreed and legally binding levels of planning obligations.  However, the level of provision of non-
market housing was the only planning obligation which could be amended.  The Vacant Building Credit 
introduced in 2014 enabled developers to be exempt from planning requirements for non-market housing 
if the space being redeveloped was vacant.  More broadly, in 2015 the government proposed to give 
tenants of housing associations a ‘right to buy’ their rental dwelling from the housing association at a 
discount to market value.      
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policy.  Circulars and PPS can be interpreted as policy documents or “information instruments” that 
basically urge local authorities to do what government deems appropriate (Vedung and van der 
Doelen, 1998, p. 103).  Additional ‘information instruments’ may then set out how policies should 
progress from general principles to practice.  Table 1 sets out the chronology of policy documents 
that referred to the financial viability of development as a criterion for development management 
and/or planning policy making.  However, no procedural guidance was initially provided to local 
authorities on how the policy was to be implemented.  It has largely been left to local planning 
authorities individually to operationalise this policy initiative.   
 
As is discussed below, a wide range of issues have needed to be addressed as the policy of using 
viability calculations has been implemented.  Given the vacuum in terms of guidance on policy 
implementation, professional bodies (e.g. RICS, RTPI), lobbying organisations (e.g. the Local 
Government Association) and quasi-autonomous government agencies (e.g. Homes and 
Communities Agency) proposed their own ‘rules’ for undertaking viability calculations and the 
related evaluation and consultation processes.  In 2016, Islington Borough Council was the first local 
planning authority to introduce detailed and comprehensive guidance on viability calculations.  
Inevitably, the documents (or models) produced have reflected to various degrees the particular 
perspectives and interests of these organisation’s members and stakeholders.    A decade after the 
Circular in 2005, clearly implying some problems in how they are being used, the central 
government in its 2015 budget statement committed itself to bringing forward proposals for a more 
standardised approach to viability assessments.   
 
Development viability calculations: key principles 
 
The basic calculations underpinning development viability appraisal modelling are relatively simple.  
As applied, it is a simple, rule-based, data model that involves estimating the costs and revenues 
from a development project.  Conventionally, the land value (often term the residual land value) is 
calculated as the difference between the value of the development project and the cost of developing 
the project.  This principle provides the basis of the standard calculative techniques that are used to 
estimate the value of development land or assets with development potential.  The basic calculation 
is:- 
     
RLV = DR – (DC+DP) 
Where RLV is residual land value, DR are expected revenues generated by the development, 
DC are the expected costs of development and DP is required developers’ profit or return.   
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Table 1 
 
Financial Viability in Planning: Key Policy Documents and Events 
 
1998  Circular 6/98: Planning and Affordable Housing stated that when using planning 
obligations to deliver affordable housing, local authorities should ‘take account of the 
needs of developers and registered social landlords who must ensure that schemes are 
financially viable.’  However, formal modelling of project viability as part of planning 
processes did not begin. 
 
2001 Consultants (Three Dragons) commissioned by the GLA assessed viability of affordable 
housing policy across London and created a development appraisal ‘toolkit’ adapting 
long-established development appraisal models.  
 
2005 Circular 5/05: Planning Obligations stated that ‘In some instances,...it may not be feasible 
for the proposed development to meet all the requirements set out in local, regional and 
national planning policies and still be economically viable...decisions on the level of 
contributions should be based on negotiation with developers over the level of 
contribution that can be demonstrated as reasonable to be made whilst still allowing 
development to take place’.  Formal modelling of project viability begins to be used for 
development management and planning policy making.  
 
2006 A Communities and Local Government document Delivering Affordable Housing stated 
that “[E]ffective use of planning obligations to deliver affordable housing 
requires…realistic affordable housing targets and thresholds given site viability.”  
However, it is notable that the objective is to enable local authorities to “raise their game 
and to recognise that such obligations will increasingly be viable on new housing 
developments”.  
 
2006 Planning Policy Statement 3: Housing stated that Local Development Documents should 
“reflect an assessment of the likely economic viability of land for housing within the area” 
 
2008 Planning Policy Statement 12: Create Safe, Strong and Prosperous Communities through 
Local Spatial Planning emphasised justification of planning policy choices and a credible 
evidence base to support them.  It also stated that local authorities should ensure “that 
partners who are essential to the delivery of the plan such as landowners and developers 
are signed up to it.” 
 
2012 The National Planning Policy Framework (2012) stated the planning authorities should 
pay “careful attention to viability”.  
 
2013 The Growth and Infrastructure Act permitted developers to obtain reductions in already 
agreed levels of non-market housing ‘based on prevailing viability…supported by 
relevant viability evidence’ (DCLG, 2013: 4). 
 
2015 In the Government’s Spending Review and Autumn Statement, it is stated that “[T]he 
government will bring forward proposals for a more standardised approach to viability 
assessments, and extend the ability to appeal against unviable section 106 agreements to 
2018.” 
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Whilst they can be disaggregated into much more detail, development costs broadly consist of a 
range of construction, professional fees, planning obligations and land transfer taxes.  Developers’ 
profit is a commonly expressed as a % of development costs or development revenues or as an 
internal rate of return.  Planning obligations and the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) affect 
both the costs and revenues.  Development revenues will usually be lower if there is a requirement 
to provide non-market housing.  Planning obligations concerning infrastructure provision and 
contributions to the provision of education, health and transport facilities may be provided ‘in kind’ 
by the developer or cash contributions.  They will tend to increase development costs. Finally, the 
viability test is that if the estimated (residual) land value is sufficiently in excess of the value of the 
land in its current use to incentivise the owner to sell the land, then it is concluded that development 
is financially viable.   This involves a comparison of the calculated land value with an estimate of, 
what has been termed, threshold or benchmark land value.  This latter concept has been probably the 
single most contested issue in development viability calculations and is discussed further below.  
 
Development Viability Modelling: Problems in Practice    
 
Whilst there has been a long established body of criticism of the current system of planning 
obligations as a mechanism of value capture e.g. deadweight losses, regressive, payment in advance 
of earnings, lack of relationships with externalities generated etc. the evaluation below not does not 
address these wider, systemic issues (see Healey, Purdue and Ennis, 1996).  The focus here is on the 
policy of using a specific calculative technique as part of the development management process.  
Jakeman et al, (2006) summed up very well some of the broad risks intrinsic to the use of technical 
models in public policy contexts.  
 
“The uses of models by managers and interest groups, as well as modellers, bring dangers.  
It is easy for a poorly informed non-modeller to remain unaware of limitations, 
uncertainties, omissions and subjective choices in models.  The risk is then that too much 
is read into the outputs and/or predictions of the model.  There is also a danger that the 
model is used for purposes different from those intended, making invalid conclusions very 
likely” (Jakeman et al, 2006, 603). 
 
To date, empirical research has focussed on the use of development viability appraisals in the 
formation of area-wide policy regarding land value capture through planning obligations (see 
Coleman et al., 2013 and McAllister et al. 2015).   Problems of policy obsolescence and lack of 
applicability to local site and market conditions were highlighted.   A key issue is that, in the local 
planning policy making context, development viability models are effectively estimating whether 
planning policies that will be implemented in the future on actual sites compromise the current 
financial viability of hypothetical projects.  In addition, less fundamentally the consultation process 
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was essentially limited to experts and community participation was absent until policy proposals 
were formed.   
 
Whilst resultant policies will create policy aspirations for specific development projects, the use of 
viability appraisals for individual projects in the development management process has been much 
more controversial.  Potential losses and gains are actual rather than hypothetical, they are short-
term rather than medium or long term, are being realised by individual developers rather than 
expressed as a policy and, are conclusive rather than being the commencement of a process of setting 
planning obligations for a scheme.  Gains and losses to the developer and/or landowner often directly 
correspond to losses and gains for the local community in the form of non-market housing, 
community facilities etc.  While there are weaknesses common to both uses of viability appraisals 
(area-wide local planning policy formation or scheme-specific local planning policy 
implementation), in this paper the focus is on the implementation of local planning policies regarding 
planning obligations at the development management stage.  The problems of viability appraisals 
are categorised in terms of; technical theoretical weaknesses in appraisal models, input and output 
uncertainty, problems of moral hazard and perverse incentives and weak governance.       
 
Model structure uncertainty  
 
Whilst the development appraisal models or techniques that have emerged from this Ricardian 
principle of residual surplus have been applied by the real estate development sector for many 
decades, there has always been a degree of model structure uncertainty.  Model structure uncertainty 
is caused by the processes of simplification and formulation inherent to any modelling (Wu and Li, 
2006). In practice, a range of development appraisal models are used that incorporate different 
approaches to: the timing of costs and revenues; whether cost and revenue inflation should be 
incorporated; the inclusion of and assumptions about debt; and the appropriate metric of return or 
profitability (see Crosby et al, 2013).  In turn, these model structure uncertainties are also present in 
development appraisal models when applied in the planning context for viability calculations (see 
Crosby and Wyatt, 2015).  A significant number of these model structure uncertainties have been 
criticised in terms of their theoretical robustness. They may well persist in practice, because in terms 
of generating model output uncertainty, the level of model structure uncertainty is dominated by 
uncertainty in the model inputs (Byrne et al, 2012). 
 
Input and output uncertainty  
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It has long been recognised that development appraisals are prone to input uncertainty. Half a century ago, 
in a Lands Tribunal decision, it was stated that “it is a feature of the residual valuation that comparatively 
minor adjustments to the constituent figures can have a major effect on results …” and “once valuers are let 
loose on residual valuations, however honest the valuers and however reasoned their argument they can 
prove almost anything”, First Garden City Ltd v Letchworth Garden City Corporation (1966) 200 EG 123, 
460. Accordingly, the residual valuation would be accepted by the Lands Tribunal only as a method of ‘last 
resort’.  However, in the absence of an alternative calculative technique, this method of last resort is 
essentially the basis of current viability calculations.  The apparent ability to prove almost anything is largely 
due to intrinsic uncertainty in the model inputs.   
 
As noted above, development viability modellers are essentially trying to estimate the development costs of 
a project (including a normal3 profit for the developer) and the revenues from the development.  Outside the 
planning context, the most important model input assumptions tend to concern construction costs and sale 
prices.  Other variables tend to be a proportion of these figures e.g. professional fees are often taken as a 
percentage4 of construction costs.  Development viability modellers are faced with uncertainty in current 
price and cost levels and uncertainty in changes in prices and costs over the development period.  The 
development period itself is also subject to uncertainty.  Due to these uncertainties, nearly all the key inputs 
into a development viability appraisal can be estimated within a defensible range.  For instance, for a 
hypothetical apartment project, assumptions regarding construction costs anywhere between £2000 and 
£2500 psm, sale prices anywhere between £11,000 and £12,000 psm, professional fees anywhere between 
8% and 11% of construction costs etc. may all be defensible and reasonable.    
 
It has been in planning appeals where the assumptions of viability models have come under most public 
scrutiny.  In one planning appeal (Appeal Ref: APP/K5600/A/09/2097458 Parkes Hotel, 41-43 Beaufort 
Gardens, London SW3 1PW) for a site in a prime central London location, a developer was able to 
demonstrate that the proposed project was unviable at any level of planning obligations.  They argued that 
they were undertaking the project at a financial loss as part of a long-term strategy.  The Inspector’s 
judgement illustrates glaringly potential for disagreement in outputs due to input uncertainty. 
 
“The toolkit evidence produced on behalf of the appellant by Cushman & Wakefield shows 
a deficit of £7,663,007, without any affordable housing being provided. It was submitted that 
the appellant would incur an overall loss on the project, but that this would be accepted as 
part of his long term aspiration to carry out improvements to Beaufort Gardens (and to allow 
further profit in the future). The appellant’s toolkit result is tested against a number of 
different scenarios, including the designation of Unit 5B as social rented housing and using 
                                                          
3 ‘Normal’ in this context is based upon the economic concept of a minimum profit necessary to attract and 
retain suppliers in a competitive market. 
4 However, the percentage itself may also be prone to uncertainty.  For example, broker’s fees may be 
assumed to be 0.5% or 0.6% etc. of sale prices.  Other variables are factual.  For instance, Stamp Duty is 
currently 4% of sale price of residential development land.   
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the District Valuer’s opinion of market value and EUV. All of these scenarios produce a 
negative result.  
 
21. Toolkit evidence on behalf of the Council was provided by the District Valuer. With no 
affordable housing provision, the “against residual” figure shows a positive sum of 
£11,792,000. With 1 affordable unit (5B), the figure would be reduced to £10,822,000 and, 
with 2 affordable units (1B & 5B), £10,338,000.22. These are significantly different results, 
arising in the main from a number of disputed input values. Evidence for both parties was 
given by professionally qualified and experienced surveyors and valuers and I do not attempt 
to determine which figures are “correct.” 
 
What constitutes a competitive return to the developer or a normal profit has also been the topic of some 
controversy.  Whilst Christophers (2013, 75) points disapprovingly to “normalization” of profit and 
perceives that profit “remains paramount, endemic” - somehow privileged, it is difficult to see how profit 
cannot be a factor in a market-led system of housing supply.  Further, whilst viability models make an 
allowance for expected developers’ profit, the actual level of profit on completion of the project is still 
subject to major uncertainty, is dependent on uncertain future revenues and costs and, consequently, can be 
substantially higher or lower than expectations.  Rather than the principle of profit itself, in practice the main 
issue concerning developers’ profit in the viability context has been the assumption of what should, prior to 
development, be an expected normal profit.  There can be a propensity in using technical models to seek 
simple, stable and general inputs.  In reality, a robust process for estimating some inputs can be complex, 
the inputs can be variable over time and can also be variable with the specific situation.   
 
Required profit tends to be closely linked to project risk which is driven by a range of project-specific and 
market-systematic factors. Market drivers will vary over time driven by the interaction of local and macro-
economic performance and the capital markets.  Individual projects will have different risk profiles.  With 
or without planning permission?  Phased or single building?  Long-term or short-term?  Pre-let or 
speculative?  Greenfield or brownfield?  So required profits levels should vary over time for the same project 
and vary between projects at any given point in time.   In practice, and perhaps not surprisingly, in the 
context of viability appraisals in the planning system developers have been attempting to set high profit 
benchmarks.  A 20% profit on revenue or a 20% internal rate of return per annum (both are quite different 
profit metrics) have emerged as benchmarks through, as one consultant commented personally to the author, 
“a mix of chutzpah and naivety”.  Nevertheless, it remains the fact that operationalising such concepts as 
a competitive return is problematic.  However, the most controversial concept to operationalise has been a 
competitive return to the land owner rather than a competitive return to the developer. 
 
Whilst most inputs into a viability model are prone to uncertainty in their estimation, this is essentially due 
to imperfect information.  There can also be uncertainty in the interpretation of an input.  In most cases, the 
test of viability has been whether, at a given level of planning obligations, the residual land value is higher 
than, what is often termed, Threshold Land Value or Benchmark Land Value.  This land value threshold or 
benchmark is meant to determine what constitutes a competitive return to the land owner and where this 
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benchmark is set is the key variable determining land value capture.  If the viability model output is a land 
value that is higher than the Threshold or Benchmark Land Value, then the planning obligations are regarded 
as deliverable.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the setting of Threshold Land Value has been at the heart of the 
controversy regarding the application of development viability modelling.  In the last decade, a blend of the 
professional bodies, local authorities, professional bodies and others have been trying to define the concept 
in their own interests with a range of perspectives being proposed.     
 
Many of the issues have been aired comprehensively in previous research (see Crosby and Wyatt, 2015 and 
Coleman et al, 2013) The debate has crystallised into a contest about whether the threshold should be based 
upon the Existing or Alternative Use Value of the land or the current Market Value of the land.  Whilst land 
owners and their representatives have favoured a Market Value based approach, the main criticism has been 
that there is a problem of circularity.  Market Value estimates are often based on the transaction prices of 
similar sites.  However, since land prices are influenced by the level of planning obligations, there is a risk 
that developers’ expectations of planning obligations implied in achieved land prices then constrain the level 
of planning obligations that are viable on other sites.  Central government seems to have been unwilling to 
provide clear guidance on this crucial issue.  Most of the guidance produced until recently has contained a 
degree of ambiguity.   
 
In its Planning Policy Guidance Note, the Department for Communities and Local Government stated that  
  
“In all cases, land or site value should: 
 
 reflect policy requirements and planning obligations and, where applicable, any Community 
Infrastructure Levy charge; 
 provide a competitive return to willing developers and land owners (including equity resulting 
from those wanting to build their own homes); and 
 be informed by comparable, market-based evidence wherever possible. Where transacted 
bids are significantly above the market norm, they should not be used as part of this exercise. 
 
The first and third bullet points are key and are not necessarily aligned. They have been given different 
weights in planning appeals.  In a 2015 planning appeal for a site in central London (Appeal Ref: 
APP/V5570/A/14/2227656 Former Territorial Army Site, 65-69 Parkhurst Road, London N7 0LP), the 
Planning Inspector displayed a very good understanding of the issues. He focussed on the topic of whether 
Existing Use Value should form the basis for estimating a competitive return to the land owner or whether 
it should be based on current land prices evidenced by transactions.  Since the precedent is so central to land 
value capture in the English planning system, the Inspector’s judgement is worth quoting at some length.  
 
“In this context I can understand the wider concern of the Council about the possible effect of inputting 
purchase prices which are based on a downgrading of the policy expectation for affordable housing on 
the eventual outcome of a scheme viability appraisal. If such prices are used to justify a lower level of 
provision, developers could then in effect be recovering the excess paid for a site through a reduced 
level of affordable housing provision. Such a circularity has been recognised in research for the RICS, 
 12 
 
and the Council in its SPD and the GLA (in its Development Appraisal Toolkit Guidance Notes of 
2014) are alive to this potential outcome of using purchase price as an input in viability assessment. 
The Council postulates an undesirable scenario of diminishing returns of affordable housing and 
eradication of the potential to achieve its delivery. It argues that the current appeal is an opportunity to 
return to a proper approach…” 
 
However, it becomes clear that the Inspector places more weight on the third bullet point from the Planning 
Policy Guidance rather than the first one. 
 
“…the PPG stresses the need to take account of market signals. The only information on such signals 
in this case supports the use of the appellant’s land value figure. Importantly, the evidence does not 
suggest that a reasonable landowner would be incentivised to release the land for development at the 
value suggested by the Council. The options for a rational owner in a rising market include that of 
holding onto the land rather than selling it below a value indicated by the market. This is consistent 
with national guidance which seeks to avoid jeopardising viability. The boosting of housing 
development in general terms assists in the supply of affordable housing. National policy is firmly in 
favour of realism and flexibility where the viability of a development is in question. In this case, the 
market evidence supports a higher valuation for the site than that used by the appellant and the scheme 
is strictly not viable on the current figures. Taking all of the above into account, the appellant’s land 
value figure (roughly what they paid) can be regarded as adequately reflecting policy requirements on 
affordable housing. Bearing in mind that the development plan policy is to seek the maximum 
reasonable rather than the maximum possible amount of affordable housing, on the available evidence 
of the current position I consider that what is being offered in this case would achieve that.” 
 
Islington Council have been at the vanguard in attempting to resist this shift towards land prices for non-
policy compliant projects becoming the benchmark for testing viability and generating consequent 
reductions in land value capture.  Since this appeal, they have introduced their own guidance (Development 
Viability: Supplementary Planning Document, January 2016) which promotes Existing Use Value as the 
appropriate benchmark and, perhaps predictably, focuses on the first bullet point in the Planning Policy 
Guidance    
 
“… a key factor in determining the benchmark land value (and the level of premium over 
EUV) is the requirement set out in PPG that in all cases land or site value should reflect 
planning policies, planning obligations and CIL. This has the direct consequence of ruling 
out significantly inflated land values arising from the grant of permission, based on 
assumptions (built into purchase prices, transactions and/or land owner aspirations) which 
do not adequately reflect planning policy. These inflated values would, if adopted, make it 
almost inevitable that those policy requirements would be found to be unviable. Such an 
approach conflicts with the statutory planning framework and undermines the plan-led 
system as established in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) and the 
NPPF. 
 
This conceptual contest which is crucial and central to land value capture continues.   
 
The estimation of viability model inputs in the planning context is then being determined by the interaction 
of a broad range of technical, regulatory, political, ideological, market and behavioural factors, If the choice 
of model inputs were independent, it would be expected that some estimates of individual inputs would be 
at the upper end of the defensible limits; others would be at the lower end.  However, if development 
viability modellers systematically opt for pessimistic but reasonable and defensible assumptions in the 
development viability appraisals submitted in support of planning applications, land values or expected 
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returns will be underestimated.  Whilst each individual model assumption may be reasonable and defensible, 
collectively the model inputs will be systematically biased.  Given that the output of such models – estimated 
land values or returns – can be very sensitive to relatively small changes in major inputs such as construction 
costs or sale prices, the implications for estimated planning obligations can be substantial.  Intrinsic 
uncertainty in the model inputs and consequent output uncertainty create the means by which development 
viability models can be systematically biased.  The process by which viability appraisals are formed 
produces an opportunity for opportunism. 
 
Incentives and Governance 
 
Given the financial trade-offs involved in land value capture, it is not surprising that land owners 
have major economic incentives to influence the outputs of viability models.   Broadly, over the last 
two decades a habitual issue has been deep disquiet about the ethics of information intermediaries 
such as rating agencies, auditing firms and equity analysts (see Lin and McNichols, 1998 and 
Michaely and Womack 1999 on equity analysts; for ratings agencies see Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 
2012; and for auditing firms see Gaver and Paterson, 2007).  Real estate appraisal has been lower 
profile but there is also a well-established body of research that finds consistent evidence that clients 
can bias real estate appraisal outcomes (see Crosby et al, 2015 for a review).  Termed economic 
dependence, the blend of individual and business incentives to attract and retain client fees in a 
context of inadequate regulatory oversight has been seen on numerous occasions to produce 
unethical bebaviour.   
 
The vast majority of development viability appraisals are produced by consultants.  This quotation 
from Norman Ralph Augustine perhaps identified the potential problem too bluntly – “All too many 
consultants when asked ‘What is two plus two?’ respond ‘What do you have in mind?’” For area-
wide viability calculations commissioned by local authorities, McAllister et al. (2015) found that 
limited economic incentives, weak understanding of the viability techniques by local politicians and 
planners, reputational risks for consultants, the participation of local market participants and public 
scrutiny of outputs provided sufficient controls on potential opportunistic behaviour by local 
planning authorities.  For scheme-specific viability calculations, the contrast is stark.  They are 
commissioned by land owners.   It is the land owner who pays for the viability appraisal5.  As noted 
above, there are substantial economic incentives for the land owner and the consultant to produce 
biased appraisals.  The land owner themselves is often an expert on development appraisal and can 
                                                          
5 It also seems to be the case the land owner pays for any evaluation of their appraisal by an expert 
appointed by the local planning authority.  This can create a relationship of economic dependence between 
the consultant scrutinising the viability appraisal and the land owner.  
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exploit inherent input uncertainty to their advantage.   The viability calculations are typically 
confidential and not subject to public scrutiny.    
 
Guidance on the conduct of viability appraisals is beginning to emerge that attempts to control for 
potential opportunistic behaviour.  The Islington SPD on development viability appraisal introduced 
a requirement for a statutory declaration from the applicant company confirming that the assessment 
submitted to the council is a true and fair reflection of the viability of the proposed development; 
and that costs and values in this assessment are consistent with current costs and values within (or 
used as a starting point for) viability assessments that have been undertaken for internal or financial 
purposes.  In addition, the declaration should state that the company undertaking the assessment has 
not been instructed on the basis of performance related pay or is incentivised in any other way 
according to the outcome of the viability process and the level of planning obligations that the 
applicant is required to provide.  However, given the facts that any viability appraisal is a snapshot 
at a fixed point in time, that there is intrinsic uncertainty in the inputs and that economic dependence 
is embedded in the production of viability appraisals, it is difficult see how such requirements can 
effectively reduce the scope for bias.   
 
The inability of the community to scrutinise viability models has also been a source of considerable 
dispute.   There is a well-established body of work on public participation and transparency in the 
planning system (see Sheppard, Burgess and Croft, 2015 for a review).  De Fine Licht (2014) 
demonstrates the relationships between perceived transparency, perceived fairness and decision 
acceptance.   Adams and Watkins (2014, 18) argue that: 
“Democratic participation that enhances public understanding and acceptance of 
controversial development projects is a more effective way to secure the legitimacy and 
acceptance of long-term investment decisions than resort to the courts.” 
 
In England, whilst a number of high profile cases have gone to the Information Commissioner for 
adjudication, land owners and developers have generally been able to submit viability models on a 
private and confidential basis.  The Information Commissioner has had to judge whether the potential 
damage to the economic interests of the developer or land owners should take precedence over the 
benefits of transparency.  Potential harm for developers has focussed on disclosure of commercially 
valuable information, protection of commercial bargaining positions, avoidance of commercially 
significant reputational damage and disclosures that could would otherwise result in a loss of revenue 
or income.  Judgements by the Information Commissioners have been inconsistent.  In some cases, 
full disclosure has been ordered, on others partial disclosure has been recommended and no 
disclosure has been recommended in a number of cases.  In the most recent case, regarding the 
redevelopment of a shopping centre in Hackney, London, the Information Commissioner concluded 
that “The public interest in favour of disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in maintaining 
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 Table 2          A Summary of the Key Limitations of the Use of Development Viability Calculations for Development Management 
       
 Problems Type Primary cause Importance Preventable? Comments 
1 Model input uncertainty 
Information 
uncertainty 
Imperfect information High No  
2 Output uncertainty Result uncertainty Input uncertainty High No  
3 
Ambiguous guidance on competitive 
return to the land owners 
Contested guidance Lack of consensus High Yes 
Requires clear and authoritative 
guidance 
4 Conflicting guidance Weak governance Lack of consensus High Yes 
Requires clear and authoritative 
guidance 
5 Poor transparency Weak governance Procedural weakness High Yes 
Requires clear and authoritative 
guidance 
6 Model structure uncertainty Weak technique Persistence of poor practice Low Yes 
Requires clear and authoritative 
guidance 
7 Incentives to bias inputs Moral hazard Production process High Yes 
Requires viability calculators to be 
independent 
8 
Potential non-independence of 
consultants 
Moral hazard Procedural weakness High Yes 
Requires viability calculators to be 
independent 
9 Complex and costly process Weak technique Large range of data required Low Yes Simpler approaches are possible 
10 Lack of expertise in planning profession 
Knowledge 
limitations 
Lack of experience and 
education  
Low Yes 
Independent advice can be 
procured and/or better education 
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the exception.” (ICO, 2015: 17).  Whilst Islington BC have attempted to embed public disclosure in 
their SPD, despite the fact that the main purpose of submitting viability appraisals is to justify a 
lower level of land value capture by the community, the vast majority of viability appraisals remain 
unavailable to the community.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the last decade, viability calculations have become progressively embedded in many parts of the 
plan making and development management processes of the English planning system.  Largely 
through planning obligations, these calculative techniques have thus become a central component of 
the land value capture process.  Whilst it is generally presumed that the quantity of land value capture 
has reduced because of the introduction of viability calculations, there is a need for research that 
investigates the effects of viability testing on the amount of land value capture and other impacts.  
How much development has occurred that would not otherwise have occurred?  How much non-
market housing, community facilities etc. have been ‘lost’?  Estimating these counterfactuals raises 
important and challenging empirical research questions. 
 
The focus of this paper has been largely on the process of viability testing and on evaluating whether 
viability calculations are fit for purpose.   In practice, the purpose of the policy of applying viability 
calculations was not made explicit.  Its applications imply that the purpose was to provide a rational 
basis for testing whether planning policies, including policies for land value capture, can be 
“delivered” by market participants.  In the development management context, as a neutral tool, 
viability calculations are essentially being used to calculate the capacity for value capture from a 
proposed project.  A key problem is that the calculations are prone to substantial intrinsic uncertainty 
in a large number of the model inputs. Whilst calculations provide an impression of scientific 
precision, this is spurious.  The key inputs into development viability appraisals are saturated with 
uncertainty.  The result is a large degree of uncertainty in the outputs and, therefore, the potential 
value capture.  Land value capture that is based on such outputs is, to some (also uncertain) extent, 
capricious.  This is unavoidable and it may be a cost that is outweighed by the potential benefits of 
viability calculations.  However, this intrinsic model input uncertainty produces a contest over the 
calculations and, in turn, facilitates opportunistic behaviour. 
   
Although it’s an evolving topic with new guidance and precedents regularly emerging, a key issue 
in the use of viability applications has been poor governance and competing guidance.  Given the 
clear incentives for developers and land owners to bias viability calculations, the economic 
dependence of many viability consultants on developers and land owners, the lack of transparency, 
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contested or ambiguous guidance and the opportunities created by input uncertainty for bias, it 
should not be surprising that land owners tend to be able to demonstrate that they are unable to 
comply with policies on planning obligations.  This tendency has been occurring in a city with some 
of the highest land values in the world.  Of course, weaknesses in guidance and governance can be 
addressed - if there is a political will. 
 
Given the broader political and planning policy context in which viability calculations have become 
so prevalent, it would be a “rationalist’s fantasy” to ignore the power strategies and micro-politics 
involved in viability calculations (Forester, 1999, 177).  Even if there is the political will to 
‘standardise’ the process of viability calculations, of course procedural guidance can be shaped to 
favour different interests.  Networks of government ministers, civil servants, policy advisors, 
political parties, lobbying groups, corporations, professional bodies, think-tanks, activists etc. 
constitute the policy venues or deliberative arenas which, even to insiders, are often only partially 
visible and who have been trying to shape how viability calculations are produced.  Developers and 
land owners have been better resourced than local authorities and, debateably, have had a more 
sympathetic hearing from a Government that has been eager to stimulate the private housing market.  
The unresolved equivocality surrounding the concept of Threshold Land Value provides a striking 
illustration of ambiguity that has been constructive from the perspective of land owners and 
destructive from the perspective of the wider community.          
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